regarded as anything but a failure. In this recap, I offer an assessment of what went wrong.
Five predictors make up the Fiscal Model. These are shown in Table 1 . Four are borrowed or adapted from Fair (2012) : two measures of the economy, a weighted index of length of party reign, and the party of the incumbents. The values for the economic variables are forecasts that Fair posts every quarter starting two years ahead of the election and ending at the end of October, only a few days ahead of Election Day. For the purpose of forecasting, the latest I use are those posted at the end of July. Finally comes fiscal policy, the concept that gives the model its name. As shown in Table 1 , fiscal policy is described by FPRIME, a measure derived from changes in F, the share of gross domestic product taken up by federal outlays, from one presidential election year to the next. Thus, if F1›0, FPRIME=1 (expansionary); if F1‹0, FPRIME=-1 (contractionary); and if F1=0, FPRIME=0 (neutral) . FPRIME is a potent predictor of incumbent victory or defeat in presidential elections (Cuzán and Bundrick, 2005 , 2008 ). Normally, incumbents under whose administration federal spending relative to GDP falls (or decelerates, as measured by FISCAL 4 ) are returned to the White House, while those who pursue an expansionary fiscal policy are not. 4 On the performance of FISCAL, see Cuzán, Heggen and Bundrick (2009) and Cuzán and Bundrick (2009) . But as reported in Cuzán and Bundrick (2008) , FPRIME performs better, with fewer and on average smaller errors than FISCAL. As well as greater accuracy, the former has the advantage of simplicity, always a desirable trait, other things being equal. Time will tell, though, whether in future elections FPRIME It is this relationship that prompted me to ask as early as the spring of 2009
whether Barack Obama would turn out to be a one-term president. As I wrote at the time, "The most recent estimate for 2012 is that federal outlays will take up 24.3% of GDP, up 3.5% points since 2008. This is the second-largest peacetime increase from one election year to the next since 1880, edged out only by Franklin D. Roosevelt's first term surge of 3.6% points" (Cuzán 2009 ).
The Roosevelt parallel has not been lost on President Obama. In his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, he explicitly invoked FDR's name (Huffington Post, September 6, 2012) ; on other occasions, he has done so indirectly, by claiming to have "inherited the worst economy since the Great Depression" (Washington Post, October 26, 2010) . The electorate appears to agree with this assertion: exit polls on Election Day show that a majority blames Bush for the poor economy (Shear 2012; Fox News Exit Polls 2012) . If that is the case, there can be little doubt that in 1936, too, most voters held Hoover responsible for the double-digit unemployment rate during Roosevelt's first term.
But if the electorate rationally 5 parcels out blame for a depressed or recessionary economy between a Democratic president and his Republican predecessor, might it not do the same with fiscal policy? After all, during a president's first year in the White House spending is largely a function of the previous administration. It was in the fall of 2008, at the tail-end of Bush's second term, that the bank and auto bail-outs were enacted into law. Therefore, neither Mr. Obama nor his party could be called to account will continue to trump FISCAL. Be that as it may, unless otherwise noted, in the analysis that follows I use only FPRIME as the measure of fiscal policy. 5 On the rationality of the electorate, see Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2001) . Table 1 .2). Actually, as economists Paul Krugman (2012) and Mark Thoma (2012) Obama. In the remaining fourteen cases, the value obtained with the traditional measure was retained.
Next, I calculated the values of both FPRIME and NEWPRIME from values of F shown in two data series. Data series #1 is the same series I used to make the original ex ante forecast for 2012 shown in Table 1 Tables, Table 1 Of particular interest in this paper is the difference between FPRIME and NEWFPRIME for 2012: Whether measured by one or the other data series, they take opposite signs. That is, whereas with the old rule for measuring fiscal policy, wherein FPRIME was calculated according to changes in the value of F between presidential election years, Obama's first term was coded as expansionary, with NEWFPRIME his policy is coded contractionary. Also undergoing changes in coding with NEWPRIME, depending on the data series used, are the first terms of Johnson, Nixon and Reagan.
The results of estimating the Fiscal Model with FPRIME and NEWPRIME with the two sets of data appear in Table 2 . The estimate shown in column 1, obtained with FPRIME calculated from data series #1 (combined OMB-usgovernmentspending.com) is identical to the one displayed in Table 1 , column 4 in Cuzán (2012, 649) . Next, in column 2, the Fiscal Model is estimated again using FPRIME, but according to the values of F drawn from the data series#2 (<usgovernmentspending.com>). In columns 3 and 4 fiscal policy is measured with NEWFPRIME, computed in the former with data series #1 and in the latter with data series #2.
In all four estimates of the Fiscal Model displayed in Table 2 the impact of fiscal policy on the vote is substantial: switching from contractionary (-1) to expansionary (1) policy on average costs the incumbents from three to four percent points in the twoparty vote. Note, too, that except in Model II.A., the coefficients for fiscal policy vary little across data series, as do the coefficients for the four variables borrowed or adapted from Fair across all four models But the difference in the forecast for 2012 is dramatic: whereas with the unrevised measure of FPRIME, Models I.A and I.B forecast Obama to lose with 46.9% and 46.3% of the two-party vote, respectively, Models II.A and II.B, in which fiscal policy is measured with NEWFPRIME, have him winning with 51.1%. This is less than one percent point below what he is likely to receive when all the votes are counted. 6 Also shown in Table 2 well. Models I.B and II.B, which use the values from data series #2 for calculating FPRIME and NEWPRIME, respectively, did best in terms of the mean absolute error (less than 2% percent points) and the hit rate (88%). However, Model II.B outdid its closest competitor in one sense: the MAE of the missed elections was about 40%
smaller. Indeed, the largest error in Model I.B, as with Model I.A., is with the 2012 election, where it was off by more than 5%, the largest single error in the Table. By contrast, the largest error in Models II.A and II.B was incurred with elections in which at least the winner was picked correctly. A forecast that the incumbent would win with 54% of the two-party vote when in fact he takes 60% constitutes a less serious error than one where he was forecast to lose with 48% but actually wins with 52%. Thus, in the interest of avoiding "blunders," a criterion used in Cuzán and Bundrick (2008) for preferring FPRIME to FISCAL as a measure of fiscal policy, Models II.A and II.B, in 6 At the time of writing (end of November), Obama's share of the two-party vote is around 51.8%. which fiscal policy is measured with NEWPRIME, would seem to be superior choices.
In sum, it appears that the Fiscal Model with NEWPRIME, especially when calculated with data series #2, performs best.
Discussion.
When it comes to forecasting presidential election outcomes, a model constructed exclusively with fundamentals is unlikely to perform as well as those that take input from polls about voter intentions or evaluations. On the other hand, provided it is grounded in sound theory, it offers "insight about causal forces driving political valuation and electoral choice." Indeed, "We learn nothing about the causes of electoral outcomes from correlations between aggregated poll data on pre-election candidate sentiments and Election Day outcomes" (Hibbs 2013, forthcoming) .
That said, in the final analysis the bottom-line of an empirical political theory is its ability to make accurate predictions (Coleman 2007; Jones 2011) . Its very validity is affirmed or questioned by its success or failure at predicting unknown or future events. This is what Fair did after his "Presidential Vote Equation" predicted an "easy victory" for George H. W. Bush over Bill Clinton in 1992, missing the outcome by almost 10 percent points in the two-party vote (1996b). Following that failure, Fair found that the model had been miss-specified, a common defect in elections models (Jones 2011) . Accordingly, he dropped a time trend, made changes in the economic measures, zeroing two of them in "war" years, added "duration," a weighted index of the length of party reign, and updated the economic data (Fair 1996a (Fair , 1996b ). In 1998, Fair fine-tuned the "good news" variable (see Table 1 ) in the wake of a revision in the gross domestic product data from the Department of Commerce (Fair 1998) . Between 1996 and 2008, the model correctly picked the winner every time with an error of 2 percent points or less. This year, Fair's January and April forecasts called for Obama to win with 50.3% and 50.2%, respectively, but the July and October updates saw him losing by the same margin. Still, the error is a little over 2 percent points, so it will probably not lead to a revision of the model. I am struck by the some of the parallels between Fair's corrections to his "Presidential Vote Equation" after the 1992 error and the modifications to the Fiscal Model that appear to be indicated in light of this year's failure to forecast Obama's reelection victory. In this case, measurement of the defining variable was modified and the model recalibrated over a slightly different data series. These changes make for a better model fit and fewer and smaller out-of-sample errors. Only future elections will reveal whether these revisions will do for the Fiscal Model was Fair was able to do for his "Presidential Vote Equation."
Conclusion.
An assessment of this year's Fiscal Model failure suggests that the problem lay in the miscoding of Obama's fiscal policy caused by the spill-over in spending from the last year of the Bush administration into his own term. By recalculating the change in spending from the first to the fourth year of all presidents in the first term of a new party reign, the Fiscal Model (retrospectively) yields an accurate forecast for 2012. (there is no such case in the data).
Note: All quotes are from Fair (2006) . 1948, 1968, 1976, 2012 1948, 1976, 2012 1948, 1960, 1968, 1976 1948, 1968, 1976 ALLNEWS in 1920 ALLNEWS in , 1944 ALLNEWS in and 1948 are not listed in most of his data file, but were graciously supplied to me by Professor Fair.
